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Can a Defendant Explain a Previous Conviction Used for
Impeachment Purposes?
In a recent federal case, United States v. Boyer,1 wherein the
defendant was charged with obtaining money under false pretenses,
the prosecution sought to impeach the defendant's testimony by in-
quiring about certain previous convictions on "bad check charges"
and embezzlement. The defendant was allowed to say in explanation
that the "bad check charges" were all due to a mistake of his secre-
tary. The trial court did not allow him, however, to explain the
circumstances of the previous conviction for embezzlement. On ap-
peal from the defendant's conviction the court held that although
the trial court's refusal to let the defendant offer any explanation of
one conviction was technically wrong, it did not justify a reversal,
for in view of the number of his previous convictions submitted in
evidence, the failure to explain only one of them could not have
affected the verdict in this particular case. The court laid down the
rule that whether or not a defendant may explain a previous con-
viction should be left to the wide discretion of the trial judge.
2
Most jurisdictions allow previous convictions of the defendant to
be shown for purposes of attacking his credibility as a witness.3 The
controversial issue here is whether the accused should be allowed
to make a brief protestation and explanation of his prior convic-
tions. The courts which adhere to the strict rule and refuse to hear
evidence designed to mitigate and rebut the impeachment take the
position that a conviction by a competent court is conclusive proof
of guilt and to allow such explanations opens the way to a collateral
inquiry which may confuse and divert the attention of the jury
from the real issue they were impanelled to try.4 There would be
a re-investigation of the former case; for if the defendant were
permitted to explain, then the state should be allowed also to rebut
the explanation. The glib tongue of the accused would be a prolific
source of alibis and explanations, and the threat of penalties for
perjury would be of no avail to guarantee the authenticity of such
explanations. Furthermore, an explanation of a conviction would
allow the uncorroborated, oral testimony of witnesses to refute and
contradict the verity of a judgment of a court of record. 6
On the other hand it is argued that a brief protestation and ex-
planation of a conviction would not seriously disrupt and prolong
1150 F. (2d) 595 (App. D. C. 1945).
2 It is difficult to find strict consistency in the rule articulated by the
court. On the one hand the opinion states that the admissibility of the
defendant's explanation should be left to the wide discretion of the trial
judge, and then asserts that the trial court was technically wrong in not
allowing the defendant to give a brief explanation of his previous con-
viction of embezzlement. If the trial court is to be regarded as having
exercised such discretion in not allowing the explanation, it could hardly
be said that it was technically wrong.
3 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §980(1), §987(4); Chandler, At-
tacking Credibility of Witnesses by Proof of Charge or Conviction of
Crime (1932), 10 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 258.
4 Lamoureux v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., 169 Mass.
338, 47 N.E. 1009 (1897); Smith v. State, 102 Miss. 530, 59 So. 96
(1912) ; State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258 Pac. 845 (1927).
State v. Jones, 249 Mo. 80, 155 S.W. 33 (1913) ; State v. Lapan, 101
Vt. 124, 141 Atl. 686 (1928).
6 State v. Kimmell, 156 Mo. App. 461, 137 S.W. 329 (1911) ; State v.
Leo, 80 N.J.L. 21, 77 Atl. 523 (1910); Territory v. Garcia, 15 N.M. 538,
110 Pac. 838 (1910); State v. Keiller, 50 N.D. 728, 197 N.W. 859 (1924).
PREVIOUS CONVICTION
the proceedings of the issue being tried. The witness should be
permitted to state the nature of the offense for which he was con-
victed, so that the jury may better tell the extent to which his cred-
-,bility is impaired.7 The prior conviction is admitted solely for
purposes of impeachment, yet, where the defendant in a criminal
case is the witness, such evidence unwittingly may have great influ-
ence on the jury and in their minds may prove his guilt of the crime
for which he is then being tried.- A previous conviction of perjury
or of an infamous crime undoubtedly reflects upon a person's cred-
ibility and veracity as a witness; however, most states allow the
introduction of other types of convictions that involve no moral
turpitude, such as involuntary manslaughter and lesser violations
of the criminal law, and it would be most unreasonable to bar the
defendant from explaining the circumstances behind such convic-
tions.9 Since not all guilty men are equally guilty and some con-
victed men are innocent,' 0 the defendant should be allowed to explain
his previous conviction for purposes of eliciting facts which may
mitigate his guilt" in conformance with the prevailing policy of
giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt.
Modern theories of penology would warrant carrying the argu-
ment one step farther with the contention that conviction and im-
prisonment should not affect the defendant's trustworthiness and
credibility, for his incarceration was a period of reform and rehabil-
itation. 12 After his release he should be considered as having a
clean slate and should not be prejudiced by his previous conviction.
The argument has merits especially where the accused had been
given an indeterminate sentence and his release was obtained only
after a scientific study had proved him to be fully rehabilitated and
ready to reenter society. 3 However, at present penologists are
given so little control over the release and parole of convicts that
complete reformation and rehabilitation are not common. Thus the
argument would gain little reception in most courts today.
14
The justification for the admissibility of convictions is based on
the theory that the depraved character of persons who commit crimes
involving moral corruption makes them unworthy of trust in testi-
7 Dixon v. State, 189 Ark. 812, 75 S.W. (2d) 242 (1934); Calvert v.
State, 106 Tex. Cr. R. 245, 291 S.W. 906 (1927); Remington v. Judd,
186 Wis. 338, 202 N.W. 679 (1925).
8 Rice v. State, 195 Wis. 181, 217 N.W. 697 (1928) (Where defendant,
being tried for taking indecent liberties with small girl, had been pre-
viously convicted of similar crime). But see, Harris, Hints on Advocacy
(American ed. 1892) 112: "There cannot be a greater mistake than to
suppose that a man who is suffering punishment for a crime, and who
comes into the box to give evidence, will not be believed because of his
character. You will generally find that he is regarded with sympathy
to begin with. The jury will weigh his evidence scrupulously; and their
attention will be naturally drawn towards the probabilities of his story.
If you cannot touch these, you will make little effect by constantly re-
ferring to his misdeeds .... It is testimony, and not character, you must
deal with in this witness."
9 Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 155 Atl. 153 (1931); State v. John-
son, 76 Utah 84, 287 Pac. 909 (1930).
10 Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932).
11 Smith v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1112, 172 S.E. 286 (1934) (De-
fendant's previous conviction was caused by perjured testimony).
12 Barnes and Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology (1943).
'3 Cantor, Crime, Criminals, and Criminal Justice (1932) 353, 395;
Comment (1938) 3 John Marshall L. Q. 580.
14 See notes 12 and 13 supra.
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fying. 15 Therefore, it would seem that a conviction founded on a
violation of municipal ordinances or for misdemeanors involving no
element of inherent wickedness should not be allowed to be intro-
duced to impeach a witness's credibility; and if such convictions
are allowed in evidence, then the witness should be permitted to give
an explanation so that he will not be unduly prejudiced by the im-
peachment. 16
The authorities agree that all previous arrests and indictments
charged to a witness on cross-examination should be allowed to be
explained away on redirect examination, for such charges, where
there were no subsequent convictions, are mere accusations of mis-
conduct and do not evidence acts of misconduct nor affect the credi-
bility of a witness.17 The rule followed by most jurisdictions ex-
cludes such charges from being introduced at all since they carry
so little weight in impeachment, and what little weight they do
carry is unjustly prejudicial to the witness.' 8 Also, a witness should
be allowed to explain a conviction where, subsequent thereto, he was
adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity; 19 or that the conviction
was reversed on appeal.
20
Since full pardon gives a new character to the person convicted,
and re-establishes his credibility as a witness, a defendant should
be allowed to introduce the pardon to offset the impeachment. As
proof of the conviction of the accused is presented for the purpose
of impeaching his credibility, proof of pardon, whether granted
before or after the term of imprisonment has expired, is equally
relevant to that issue. Thus it would seem to be prejudicial error
to deny to the accused the right to introduce such pardon. 21 How-
ever, some authorities take issue on this point and contend that
where a pardon has followed a previous conviction, the latter's ad-
missibility for purposes of impeachment should not be affected be-
15 Lamoureux v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., 169 Mass.
338, 47 N.E. 1009 (1897); State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258 Pac. 845
(1934).
16 Clowans v. District of Columbia, 62 F. (2d) 383 (App. D.C. 1932);
Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922). Cf. Bostic v.
U.S., 94 F. (2d) 636 (App. D.C. 1937). Contra: State v. Lapan, 101 Vt.
124, 141 Atl. 686 (1928) (Where defendant being tried for murder was
not allowed to explain a conviction based on a breach of the peace).
17 State v. Weisman, 238 Mo. 547, 141 S.W. 1108 (1911) ; Anderson v.
State, 113 Tex. Cr. R. 450, 21 S.W. (2d) 499 (1929) ; Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed. 1940) §1117(4).
18 Jones, Evidence (2nd ed. 1926) §2370; State v. Greenberg, 59 Kan.
404, 53 Pac. 61 (1898); Kennedy v. International Great Northern Ry.
Co., Tex. Com. App., 1 S.W. (2d) 581 (1928). Contra: State v. Maslin,
195 N.C. 537, 541, 143 S.E. 3, 6 (1928): "But an indictment duly re-
turned as a true bill, while in a sense an accusation, is much more than
a bare charge; it is an accusation based upon legal testimony and found
by the inquest of a body of men, not less than twelve in number, selected
according to law, and sworn to inquire into matters of fact, to declare
the truth, and as preliminary to the prosecution to find bills of indict-
ment when satisfied by the evidence that a trial ought to be had."
19 People v. Hoenschle, 132 Cal. App. 387, 22 P. (2d) 777 (1933).
20 Bolling v. U.S., 18 F. (2d) 863 (C.C.A. 4th, 1927); Benedict v.
State, 190 Wis. 266, 208 N.W. 934 (1926).
21 Bryant v. U.S., 257 Fed. 378 (C.C.A. 5th, 1919); Perry v. State,
146 Fla. 187, 200 So. 525 (1941) ; State v. Taylor, 172 La. 20, 133 So.
349 (1931); Gaines v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 368, 251 S.W. 245 (1922).
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cause a pardon is not based upon a finding of innocence unless the
pardon expressly so declares.
22
Since it is probable that cases will arise where it would be ex-
tremely unjust to forbid a defendant to extenuate his guilt in a
previous conviction, the strict rule forbidding explanations of con-
victions would bring with it a sub-standard type of justice. The
suggestion in the principal case,23 to the effect that a wide discre-
tion be given to the trial court judge in deterniining whether the
defendant should be permitted to explain his prior conviction, is a
very practical solution to the problem.2 4 He is best able to observe
the witness and counsel and to estimate the effect such evidence will
have on the jury.25 In addition the trial judge is in the best position
to determine the extent to which the admission of such evidence will
divert the court from the real issue of the case.
The defendant can be admonished as to the penalties of perjury, 26
and his explanation limited to a brief statement or two. If the trial
-judge gives the accused too much leeway, it is likely that the jury
would give very little credence and weight to an ex-convict's un-
corroborated assertion of innocence or of extenuating circumstances.
In the words of Wigmore, "It would seem a harmless charity to
allow the witness to make such protestations on his own behalf."
27
Thus in the principal case,28 the court, in advocating a liberal
policy toward admitting explanations of a defendant's prior con-
victions, has logic and justice substantiating its decision, and has
set a sound standard for other jurisdictions to follow.
Thomas S. Chuhak
22 Gallagher v. People, 211 Ill. 158, 168, 81 N.E. 842, 847 (1904);
Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §980(3); Curtis v. Cochran, 50 N.H.
242 (1870) : "A pardon is not presumed to be granted on the ground of
innocence or total reformation. It removes the disability, but does not
change the common-law principle that the conviction of an infamous
offence is evidence of bad character for truth. The general character of
a person for truth, bad enough to destroy his competency as a witness,
must be bad enough to affect his credibility when his competency is re-
stored by the executive or legislative branch of the government."
23 U.S. v. Boyer, 150 F. (2d) 595 (App. D.C. 1945).
24 Donelly v. Donelly, 156 Md. 81, 143 Atl. 648 (1928).
2 5 See U.S. v. Boyer, 150 F. (2d) 595, 596 (App. D.C. 1945).
26 Mas v. U.S., 151 F. (2d) 32 (App. D.C. 1945).
27 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §1117(3).
28 U.S. v. Boyer, 150 F. (2d) 595 (App. D.C. 1945).
